"THE WHOLE CITY MUST NEVER CEASE SINGING": PLATO AND THE COMMUNITY OF THE MUSICAL *NOMOS*

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Abstract

This paper explores the fundamental tenets of Plato's philosophy of education, articularly his views on a practice of great educational potential: communal musical participation. According to Plato, music can attune the individual and the community to cosmic harmony and this, in turn, is the only way to form and maintain a community. The paper explores how the concepts of ethos *and* nomos *are utilized to explain music's role in community cohesion. It argues that Plato's understanding of the power of immediate and pre-reflective participation in music can provide valuable insight for contemporary*

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philosophy of music education. The concept of nomos, *in particular, allows music educators to take this frame of thought to better understand the role of music in creating communities.*

Keywords: Plato, communal music, music education

A PRELIMINARY METHODOLOGICAL REMARK

Contemporary research in music often delineates music as an object of experience within an epistemological framework based on principles taken from the human sciences about the constitution of the human subject. The object of music is thus observed on the basis of epistemological assumptions derived from methodologies, which have often been developed without concern for the particularity of the phenomenon of music. An acknowledgment of this problem and a possible solution was suggested by Andrew Bowie who proposes that, "Rather than seeing the role of philosophy as being to determine the nature of the object 'music,' [my book] focuses on the philosophy which is conveyed by music itself."[1] Bowie envisioned a philosophy which would be born out of the tension between defining a philosophical field on par with music as such, claiming that "[t]he very difficulty of arriving at this location is actually what is most revealing."[2] In order to avoid "merely confirming the philosophical and methodological presuppositions that one adheres to before engaging with music,"[3] such a philosopher is challenged to think a "philosophy that emerges from music."[4] We suggest that all attempts to philosophize in this way about music, however partial or preliminary they may be, may be called "music philosophies" as opposed to "philosophies of music."

A methodological turn such as this could affect the philosophy of music education as well. One could attempt to delineate, at least preliminarily, the scope of a *music* philosophy of (music) education by, first of all, facing the phenomenon of music, and afterwards facing the practice of music pedagogy, thus ultimately developing a philosophy of music education. In this vein, the following text will attempt to investigate what might be called a "paradigmatic" case[5] of a music philosophy of education: the philosophy of Plato.[6] Plato's educational work is usually treated on the basis of his idealistic metaphysics. This paper, however, proceeds from a different starting point, namely, from a practice, which, we would argue, lies at the bottom of Plato's philosophy of education: music itself.[7] Thus, in the following, we will try to point out the ways in which Plato's musical intuitions serve as a foundation for his entire political system sustained by a musical education. In the terms of contemporary educational theory, it would seem that Plato envisioned an enormous field for communitarian practice deeply imbedded in educational activities.

The character of Plato's music philosophy of education is perhaps most distinct in the concept of *ethos*. It is the musical character of *ethos*, that provides the framework for music education in Plato's philosophy and justifies music's role in pedagogical practice. *Ethos* is what, within the person and the political community, receives and sustains the musical harmony that governs Plato's state.[8] It is thus the primary field of any educative practice. Additionally, we will investigate the idea of *nomos* in Plato's philosophy which is arguably what the musical harmony in the state proceeds from. The musical *nomos* is ultimately the building block of Plato's philosophy, by being the main locus of statecraft, education, and communal participation. Our main focus will be to see how the *ethos* established in active musical participation is constituted by the musical *nomos* and to what extend it is a result of musical harmoniousness. This allows the concepts of *nomos* and *ethos* to contribute to our understanding of the educative force of music in today's diverse society.

ETHOS AND MUSIC

Plato's music philosophy of education is expressed in a number of dialogues, most notably the *Republic* and *Laws*. It is in these dialogues that he develops his most comprehensive ideas on the symbiotic bond between politics and the practice of music. Education is directly connected to or established through the upbringing of individuals and the sustaining of the whole community. Politics has the purpose of regulating the activities of the community to its best benefit. Further, the person and the community are both related to universals such as the idea of *harmony*. As a result, every part of the human world–from the private through the public to the universal–is interconnected. It is through this interconnectedness, which is fundamentally musical, that Plato's philosophy of education should be understood.[9]

At the core of Plato's philosophy of education lies the idea that music defines the basic ethical principles of a person or a community, as established in the *Republic*: "For never are the ways of music moved without the greatest political laws being moved, as Damon says, and I am persuaded."[10] Plato sees musical education as the only thing that could sustain the *ethos* needed for a strong and stable political system. Music instils a harmony in the child, which allows it to judge correctly only because it shapes its *ethos*. Plato understands music as immediately pedagogical in that it captivates the soul and imprints on it a certain *ethos*. In this view, we argue, *ethos* is inherently musical. The immediate and captivating force of music is not simply a contingent fact–*ethos* is a *musically* situated character. There is, according to Plato, something within the relationship between person and music, which defines the genuine ethicality of that person.

The ability of music to shape the state of the soul is revealed in the polyvalent meaning of the word *trópoi* which Allan Bloom translates as "ways"[11] and others translate as "modes."[12] *Tropos* implicates the "character" of a musical performance as immediately related to the *ethos* of those who are listening.[13] It is by attuning the soul that the musical *tropos* imprints a certain *ethos* onto it. "Tropos" is both a *way* of being and a *mode* of music; in fact, from the vantage point of an ancient Greek mindset, there is arguably no difference between the two.

Drawing on Damon's doctrine–who had major influence on Plato–in the accounts of Aristides Quintilanius and Athenaeus, Nina Valiquette Moreau highlights the importance of "assimilation" (*homoiotes*) in the relationship between music and *ethos* and emphasizes the "specifically musical notion of *homoiotes*: ethical assimilation is possible in music because music and soul are similar in both structure and movement."[14] The isomorphism of music and *ethos* implies their common origin and their permanent interrelationship. Athenaeus affirms that music is an accurate reflection of the soul: "those souls that are beautiful and characteristic of free men create songs and dance of the same kind, while the opposite sort create the opposite."[15]

Musical participation does not require preliminary theoretical competence. For example, lack of reflective experience of the ability to speculate about music would not prevent children from being brought up *through* music. On the one hand, Plato understands musical competence as being in some way natural (as opposed to cultural), for example, with regard to the tendency of the soul to react to particular musical harmonies. On the other hand, the emergence of true musical competence in children, or their musical enculturation,[16] seems to pertain to what Emmanuel Bigand and Bénédicte Poulin-Charronnat called "fundamental musical intuitions." These intuitions are not related to "explicit judgments on specific aspects of the musical structure,"[17] such as the content of most music theoretical knowledge, and can ultimately "develop just by living in a rich musical environment."[18] There is, according to Plato, something within music which does not require a reflective attitude to be experienced and, consequently, a reflective education to be enculturated.[19] *Ethos* is musical in the sense that it is *mimetically* related to the *tropos* of music.[20] The correlation between *ethos* and musical *tropos* is not a cognitive one: music educates "through habits [*ethesi*], transmitting by harmony a certain harmoniousness, not knowledge [*epístamai*], and by rhythm a certain rhythmicalness."[21] *Ethos* is not "epistemologically" transmitted. Rather, it is *harmonia*, which teaches harmoniousness, and musical *tropoi*, which teach *ethos*.

The educational implication of this is that (certain) music can attune to a certain *ethos* even before the reasoned part of the soul has been developed.[22] Thus, music education can be established, even achieved as essentially *pre-reflective*.[23]

According to Plato, music has a direct relation to the inmost part of the soul by taking hold of it through harmony and rhythm. It is capable of affecting the child long before it is able to grasp reasonable speech. Additionally, the child learns how to judge correctly *before* learning how to reason. Plato restates this in *Laws*:

> Education, I say, is the virtue that first comes into being in children. Pleasure and liking, pain and hatred, become correctly arranged in the souls of those who are not yet able to reason, and then, when the souls do become capable of reasoning, these passions can in consonance with reason affirm that they have been correctly habituated in the appropriate habits. This consonance in its entirety is virtue.[24]

Musical absorption and the beginning of music education as an activity is thus essentially pre-reflective but nevertheless forms the foundation of the prospective education of reason.

In a broad sense, the role of musical practice, together with gymnastics, is to bring the parts of the soul to a "symphony" (*sýmphōnos*) with one another.[25] Music, in particular, does this as a reflection–or an embodiment–of the harmony of the cosmos. It is what binds the private soul of the person to the universal soul of the cosmos.[26] The person who is attuned to music is also in tune with the harmony of the cosmos.

From this vantage point, the relationship between music and education takes an interesting and daring turn. On the one hand, music has immediate access to the soul and is capable of teaching and fostering the soul pre-reflectively, that is, without the soul even realizing *that* or *what* is being taught or recalled (revealed in *anamnesis*). In addition, a well-attuned soul is what accommodates the education of the *nous*.[27] The reasoned part is something to be developed through education. Moreau finds this connection to be crucial: "music assimilates itself to the soul as a kind of extra-rational perception or recognition that, in turn, prepares the soul for reasoned judgement; music prepares the soul to recognize its kinship to reason and its affinity to the virtues."[28] Music is not only a possible but a necessary prerequisite to all further education.

ETHOS AND THE COMMUNITY OF THE MUSICAL *NOMOS*

Although there is a scholarly consensus on the fact that music's value in Plato's education theory lies in its capacity to imitate or represent the correct *ethos*[29], there seems to be even more to the educative value in music. In fact, there is an aspect of musical experience which, though not *ethical* in the strict

sense, would still be considered invaluable to education and the life of the community in Plato's worldview.[30] This point is made especially clear in the notion of the musical *nomoi*: "our songs (ᾠδάς) have become *nomoi* (laws)."[31] Music can become a law that can regulate both the soul and the state.

The word *nomos* can mean a vast number of things in the historical context of the dialogue *Laws*.[32] It would suffice here to start from the idea of *nomoi* as the laws of the state and to gradually reveal its musical fundamentals. The singular of *nomoi*, *nomos*, would arguably be useful when pointing out the ideal, unified relation between the person, the community, and the law(s) and so both forms of the word will be used throughout the text depending on the context.

The first aspect of the *nomos* is its *external* character, that is, as a law of the state.[33] The *nomoi* are not tied to the citizens through obligation or coercion but through persuasion. The purpose of education (*paideíā*) is precisely to persuade children–and remind adults–to follow the *nomoi*.[34] As Eleonora Rocconi points out, "In the *Laws*, the young's souls must be persuaded (πείθειν τὰς τῶν νέων ψυχάς) and not obliged to follow what would do most good to the State (τί πείσας μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἐργάσαιτο ἂν πόλιν)."[35] Thus, the *nomoi* have to be accepted and followed freely, not forced upon the citizens or children. In the awe before the *nomos*, there is a soul with free will that is convinced of the correctness of its active relation to *nomos*. The "enslavement" to the *nomoi* is voluntary: "Under the ancient laws, my friends, our populace was not sovereign over certain matters but was rather voluntarily enslaved, in a certain sense, to the laws."[36] Thus the idea of volition, as opposed to coercion, is crucial to the relation between citizens and state. And it is the *nomoi* which provide the middle ground–and core–of this relation.

Hence, we come to the second aspect of the *nomos*–the *internal* one. The *nomos* is a personal law because it is immediately connected to the *ethos* of a person. Ultimately, the *nomos* connects the personal *ethos* to the *ethos* of the community. This connection is, in fact, musically established and music turns out to be an ethos integrating procedure regulated by the nomoi. But if the *nomoi* of the state are "those regulating the music,"[37] how are musical laws supposed to be laws of the state, and not just a tool *of* the state? This ambiguity is also related to the etymology of the word *nomos* which, among other things, was recognized as a way of musical expression: "The term *nomos* comes from the root **nem*-, alternating with **nom*-, comprising many meanings and nuances in ancient Greek language, whose primary sense is 'to distribute'. The basic meaning of the term is 'local usage, custom' which, applied to music, becomes 'localized melodic idiom.'"[38] When Plato discusses how to define the law of the state, he stumbles upon this strange fact but takes advantage of it:

> We are saying, then, that the strange fact should be accepted that our songs (δάς) have become *nomoi* (laws*) for us just as in ancient times people gave this name, so it appears, to songs sung to the *kithara*. Hence they would probably not have disagreed with our present contention, which one of them perhaps dimly divined, as it were in a dream or a waking vision."[39]

By referencing the ancients, Plato means to legitimize his claim completely. He believes, it seems, that the *nomoi* are inherently musical and have been such all along, in one way or another.

The state under musical *nomoi* is not meant as a metaphor but as a habitual reality. The musical *nomoi* realize themselves through unceasing participation in song from everyone in the city:

> That every man and child, free and slave, female and male–indeed, the whole city–must never cease singing, as an incantation to itself, these things we have described, which must in one way or another be continually changing, presenting variety in every way, so that the singers will take unsatiated pleasure in their hymns.[40]

It is through singing that the laws of the state are truly enacted. The communal singing, which never ceases, carries the promise of lasting communal bonds and a strong state. Plato seems to have envisioned an all-embracing communal activity that immediately takes hold of the personal *ethos* while intimately relating the soul to the Other.[41] The communal relationship, which Plato describes, transgresses all social boundaries–free people and slaves, women and men, all participate equally in the incantation of the city to itself. All people, regardless of their qualities or social status, are equal before and through the musical law.

The *nomoi* of the state do not work just by legitimizing political or ideological procedures–such as communicative actions–but through direct musical participation, that is, acts of communion. It is through communion that the personal *ethos* becomes attuned to the *ethos* of the community. Participation in dance and song–that is, in *khoreia*–is immediate participation in the musical *nomos*. Thus, in Plato's state the law is not something external to the citizen but rather something internal: the musical *nomos is* sensed and experienced as personal *ethos*. As Penelope Murray and Peter Wilson succinctly conclude, "the ideal city is effectively to be sung and danced into existence."[42] Plato understood this to be the only way a stable community can be maintained–not through rational deliberation (even based on rational-metaphysical presuppositions) but through musical participation. In the state, Plato's metaphysical concepts should inevitably be experienced as immanent–and they do, through the musical *nomos*.

Surely, in Plato's view, the pursuit of equality before the musical *nomos* excludes by necessity an arbitrariness of the *nomos* itself. Much of the discussion on the musical laws in his oeuvre has to do with the historical context in which he was writing and particularly the so-called 'New Music' that emerged in Athens and elsewhere in Greece during the fifth and fourth century B.C. During that time musicians started mixing modes, modifying instruments, and changing genres, particularly in theater music. Plato's comments on the rules of music seem to be a reaction to the innovations of musicians.[43] As Plato would have it, there are very particular musical *nomoi*, which correspond to virtuous *ethos*: "But this much about the music is true and worthy of thought: it was possible to be firm about such things, and mandate in law songs which are by nature correct. . . . So, as I said, if someone could grasp in any way what is correct in these things, he ought boldly to order it in law."[44]

PLATO AND MUSIC EDUCATION TODAY

In order to make sense of Plato's music philosophy of education today, we need to account for this new way of thinking about the musical *nomos* and its power to form communities. This viewpoint introduces tension in the way in which we reflect on the impact of music and, in particular, its ethical impact. This, in turn, requires us to reconsider the music-*ethos* relationship.

The power of music, that is, of musical *nomoi*, has never been denied. Today, too, most people sing, play, listen, and participate in communities through music. Music comes in all shapes and sizes, and there is doubtless also music which most of us would consider inappropriate for educational purposes. However, this too *is* music. The musical *nomos can* be present in music, which–through text, visuals, or other means–incites to promiscuousness, violence, and other behavior we would consider unethical. Musical harmoniousness can potentially be present in all music, regardless of its ethical implications. And so, if we want to use the musical *nomos* for educational goals, we would need a new understanding of *ethos*. In other words, we would need to answer the question: How can musical *nomoi*, which can appear in so many different ways, be used for community formation in the music classroom?

The answer is not as self-evident as is usually maintained. Based solely on Plato's reflection on musical modes in the *Republic*, we may argue that the music-*ethos* relationship is simple because it is purely mimetic–music gives rise to an *ethos* because it imitates it. In fact, contemporary education systems tend to think in a very similar way about the influence of music–that the Ionian mode should lead to an Ionian child, whatever that means in contemporary context (for example, a happy, positive, emotionally independent, generous child). But, in

reality, this is often far from the truth. For a child or an adolescent may be subject to Ionian music all day long at school, and then turn to quite different musical modes (or genres) when it is on its own or with peers outside of school.

We propose that Plato, albeit implicitly, understood in *Laws* that *this* is music's primary power (and weakness)–like wind, the musical *nomos* "blows where it wishes." Today, there are no universal rules for music, and even if one were empowered to establish such, it would be indeed hard to "order in law"[45] musical elements that would, by necessity, lead to virtue. For it has been proven time and time again that most music can be used for good and evil, depending on the context, the message, or the visuals (the Nazi appropriation of Wagner and Beethoven stand as paradigmatic examples). Music is a powerful tool in any agenda that has to do with human behavior. Our purpose in this paper has been to show how and why it is powerful–how to master this power is an altogether different, and difficult, question that would require further discussion.

Indeed, if what has been put forward so far is correct, and musical participation in the *nomos* is a way to establish harmony (which connects the individual, the community, and the cosmos), then *musical ethos*–the one instilled by music–is defined firstly in terms of its relation to the *nomos*, as the imprint of musical harmoniousness on the soul. This point of view may reveal new ways (or remind us of some old ways) of thinking about *ethos*' normative aspects as such. If we want a working education theory and practice of music, the important ontological position of the musical *nomos* inevitably brings about the need to establish an *ethos* theory that could sustain a methodological criterion for stable *ethos-nomos* relationship in music activities.[46]

We can begin to understand how difficult this process would be, if we consider the fluidity of identity formation in the period of adolescent development. On the surface we may argue that musical identity keeps the child, particularly the adolescent, connected to others, albeit sometimes virtually, with regard to something special and unique–namely, a deeply emotional, deeply relatable musical experience. To be a fan of Mos Def, Metallica, Miles Davis, Bach, or a folk singer of a particular culture–these are identifications which project a pre-reflective, immediately sensed musical meaning onto a community and one's own participation in it. Whether or not these or other musicians or musics are integrated into formal curricula, their educative significance is certain. Adolescents today will always look for and find their own music–the music that resonates with their inner world–and will identify with others who listen to the same music–with their culture, behavior, clothing, and so on. And although their own social or cultural background may play a role in their musical preferences, it is ultimately even more significant that music itself precipitates the creation of (and accommodation to) communities.[47]

Yet, if musics can instil good, or bad, or any kind of ethos for that matter, then community formation, from this perspective, cannot be the sole criterion for our assessment of music as educationally valuable. A counter-argument here would be that to subject music to strict moral scrutiny, especially with regard to its relation to child and adolescent identity, would be to presuppose a *static* view of identity as such. One could see an adolescent identify with music that promotes violence, crime and sexual promiscuity and imagine that they will obtain and enact these "characters" (*ethesi*). While coincidentally this may be the case, such a view misses out on a very important feature of child and adolescent identities–namely, that they are fundamentally *fluid* and subject to continuous change. An adolescent's musical identity at any given time should be regarded as dynamic, as a part (significant or not) of a bigger process of musical, cultural, and personal development. Such an identity is situational, provisional, undecided. The young explore possibilities of identity in and through themselves. Most youth would jump into a certain mode of music without reflecting explicitly on its moral features, because it is the pre-reflective character of musical experience that gives it its allure. Additionally, such an attitude allows them to have immediate, pre-reflexive "access" to (musical) identities–through music they are able to evidence the life of others as if *from within*–others as diverse as a gangster, a rebellious hitchhiker, or a pious composer. This immediate and yet fluid participation in a community or culture is one of the main things that attract seeking young people to music. And this is not simply an accidental fact of their development, but a fundamental one. Music attunes the soul from within but in this attunement it allows the soul to experience itself in alternate identities. What is it like to be Ice Cube, Bob Dylan, or J. S. Bach–not as historical persons, but in terms of what the soul witnesses through communing with the same musical *nomoi* as them?

So, instead of focusing on the predefined moral purport of these identities, we could potentially suppose that they have educative power that remains to be understood. In a sense, *any* authentic relation to a musical *nomos* is valuable. It is valuable as musical experience, as an experience of the soul with its ability to modulate between *nomoi*, to be attuned to them. Whether the soul reproduces what it hears or sees (through lyrics or videos) in its life, is again a different question altogether.

So, in conclusion, while not all music is suitable for education and for the classroom, all music should, at least informally, be taken into consideration in terms of its educative value. The music classroom has, of course, also been noted to have a life of its own. And, thus, by extension, perhaps also a *nomos* of its own. As diverse as it can be in terms of its participants, the music classroom has the potential of inspiring students to participate in a *nomos*. Heidi Westerlund, Heidi

Partti, and Sidsel Karlsen have coined the term "community cohesion" to emphasize this power of classroom musical activities.[48] Community cohesion consists in the possibility "to form a 'we,' such as a collective identity in the social configurations of a music classroom."[49] More importantly, the authors underscore the non-ideological aspects of this form of communal formation, which goes beyond the conflict between legitimizing and resistance identities and fosters "collective, classroom-based project 'identities of becoming'"[50] instead. Thus, the classroom could turn into a musical world for children who would then participate in this world and acquire new musical identities within this world. These identities are *inclusive* insofar as they include everyone who wants to participate and *exclusive* insofar as they pertain (at least provisionally) only to the life of the classroom in itself.

IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION

It has been our main goal to explore Plato's educational thought from the perspective of a music philosophy of education. It has been demonstrated, albeit in a broad fashion, how the concepts of *ethos*, *nomos*, the state, the soul, and the community all have to do with a musical setting of being as such. From the perspective of Plato's music philosophy of education, the presence of musical *nomos* is the primary criterion for the value of music education and, in a sense, of all education. For if the ultimate goal of education is the sustaining and flourishing of the community, this goal is attainable only through singing together of all its members in which the private soul is harmonized with the community through and because of the harmony of the cosmos.

But the broad and powerful educational potential of the musical *nomos* has to be delineated in terms of particular practices, repertoires, and experiences. For there are indeed musical practices governed by ethically indifferent laws, and musical *nomoi* can also serve various connotations, messages, ideologies. And so, even though the *musical nomos* is the primary criterion for music education, today we cannot (and, actually, may never be able to) ascribe specific educational value to it or prescribe safe ways of utilizing it for educational purposes. The important thing is–in terms of Plato's music philosophy of education, explicated in *Laws*–to realize that music is a powerful force that harmonizes the being of the individual and the community according to its own laws, often regardless of any external principle that we may (try to) subjugate it to. But beyond this, much more reflection would be necessary to understand how to tame music for educative purposes, without depriving it of its power and alure, of its *nomos*. This process would necessitate an elaborate mediation between metaphysical assumptions and (the implications of) pre-reflective musical experience.

NOTES

[1]Andrew Bowie, *Music, Philosophy, and Modernity*, Modern European philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), xi.

[2]Bowie, *Music, Philosophy, and Modernity*, 10.

[3]Bowie, *Music, Philosophy, and Modernity*, 11–12.

[4]Bowie, *Music, Philosophy, and Modernity*, 11.

[5]"A Paradigmatic case may be defined as an exemplar or prototype. Thomas Kuhn has shown that the basic skills, or background practices, of natural scientists are organized in terms of 'exemplars' or 'paradigms' the role of which in the scientific process can be analyzed." (https://www.wikidoc.org/index.php/Case_study#Paradigmatic_case)

[6]Throughout the text we will be using the following translations to Plato's dialogues (unless noted otherwise): Plato, *The Republic of Plato*, 2nd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1991) Plato, *Timaeus and Critias* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) Plato and Thomas L. Pangle, *The Laws of Plato*, University of Chicago Press ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). Occasionally we will also use some translations by Benjamin Jowett or Andrew Barker (Andrew Barker, *Greek Musical Writings*, Cambridge readings in the literature of music (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

[7]It is clear that what Plato in this context would refer to as music is rather "the art of the Muses" or *mousikē* which comprises music, dance, and text, rather than just music See Penelope Murray and Peter Wilson, "Introduction: Mousikē, Not Music," in Penelope Murray and Peter Wilson, eds., *Music and the Muses* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1–8. Admittedly, a complete reconstruction of Plato's ideas on "music" as *mousikē* would require a more detailed analysis of dance and poetry at his time. But the following text is based on the premise that Plato's concept of music is in any case yet to be discovered through Plato's writings themselves. Moreover, there are many musical practices even in our contemporary world which are inseparable from dance, or lyrical song, or both, such as the opera, the traditional *khoro* on the Balkans (genealogically connected to the Greek *khoreia*), or a rave party. All these practices are rightfully called "musical" although they do not consist simply of playing or listening to acoustical sound.

[8]While being aware of the incongruence in using the term "person" for Plato's philosophical discourse, we would deem it even more inappropriate to use the more common and perhaps acceptable term "individual." The reasons for this are as following. Firstly, the term "person" explicitly defines a human being as a subject, while the term "individual," although often used in a similar sense, is actually a *predicate*, related to the human being, rather than a subject in itself. Thus, in the classical (although certainly not Platonic) definition by Boethius, "Persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia," the "persona" is the subject, while the "individual" is an adjective that defines a property of the "substantia." Moreover, the term "person," at least in its traditional sense, implies an essential constitution of the human being on which Plato would definitely insist, while the term "individual" only assumes the wholeness of the human being and, by means of cultural association, its inherent separateness from all other human beings. This last idea, which we consider decisive for a common sense understanding of "individual," seems alien to Plato who considered the human being an essentially communal being. Thus, we retain

the usage of the term "person" throughout the text with regards to each and every human being in Plato's state.

[9]In this text, it will not be possible to provide a comprehensive introduction to the traditional interpretation of Plato's philosophy of music, in which music (as all other arts) is considered simply a copy of the sensible world, which is only a copy of the true world of Ideas. In this metaphysical view, musical activity is considered of lesser value to education than reflective contemplation because of its mediated access to the immutable Ideas. Here, we establish a different view of music in Plato, in which music is foregrounded as fundamental to education because of its immediate connection to the harmony of the cosmos. While the metaphysical view of music is more dominant in *Republic*, the second view is underscored in *Laws* in the idea of the musical *nomos*, which is detailed below.

[10]*Republic*, 424c.

[11]Plato. *The Republic of Plato*. Allan Bloom and Adam Kirsch, eds (New York: Basic Books, 2016).

[12]Such as Jowett: "So Damon tells me, and I can quite believe him; he says that when modes of music change, the fundamental laws of the State always change with them." (Plato, "The Republic. Book IV," accessed March 28, 2023, http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.5.iv.html). The *mousikís trópoi* refer to Greek modes like "Dorian" or "Lydian" which are discussed at length in *The Republic* (See *Republic*, 399a). But both aspects of the word are both instinctive and inseparable. In ancient Greek thought "tropos" is a musical mode, that is, a *way* of enacting musical sound, while at the same time being a particular attunement of the soul that participates in this act. In this respect, a musical *tropos* can be used as a synonym for a musical *harmonia* (Thrasybulos G. Georgiades, *Nennen Und Erklingen*: *Die Zeit Als Logos*, Sammlung Vandenhoeck (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985), 105.) *Tropos*, however, while having a similar meaning, is more related to the act of singing or play–it reflects the "way" a melody is presented (Georgiades, *Nennen und Erklingen*, 105).

[13]"Choral performances are imitations of characters (*trópon*), in all sorts of action and fortune, and each brings to bear both his habitual dispositions (*ethesi*) and his capacity to imitate. Now those whose character is in accord with what is said and sung and in any way performed–because of nature or habit or both–are necessarily delighted by the things, and led to praise them and pronounce them fine." (*Laws*, 655d-e.)

[14]Nina Valiquette Moreau, "Musical Mimesis and Political Ethos in Plato's Republic," *Political Theory* 45, no. 2 (2017): 202. https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591715591587

[15]Athenaeus. *Deipnosophistae*, in Barker, *Greek Musical Writings*, 628c. Quoted in Moreau, "Musical Mimesis and Political Ethos in Plato's Republic," 202.

[16]See *Republic*, 424e–425a; *Laws*, 659d–660a.

[17]Emmanuel Bigand and Bénédicte Poulin-Charronnat, "Are We 'Experienced Listeners'? A Review of the Musical Capacities that Do Not Depend on Formal Musical Training," *Cognition* 100, no. 1 (2006): 103–4. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2005.11.007.

[18]Bigand and Poulin-Charronnat, "Are We 'Experienced Listeners'?" 121.

[19]In fact, only the elders in Plato's state are responsible for *knowing* the modes so that they can legislate and then regulate the proper modes for every particular occasion or particular group of people (*Laws*, 667a-b).

[20]As Moreau points out, "[t]he mechanism by which the guardians are to be educated and in turn preserve the unity of the *polis* is made possible through a mimesis that is distinctly and uniquely musical; only musical mimesis incorporates the juridical and ethical traditions I have just discussed." (Moreau, "Musical Mimesis and Political Ethos in Plato's Republic," 201.)

[21]*Republic*, 522a.

[22]According to Plato, the human soul is split into three parts–the reasoned part, *nous* or the *logistikon*, the spirited part or *thymoeides*, and the appetitive part or *epithymetikon*. All three parts have a specific function in the human soul (*Rep.* 439e–441a.) The three parts of the soul can be allied or come in conflict with one another. The spirited part may, for example, get angry at the desires of the appetitive part and it can be united with the *nous* on this account (*Republic*, 440a–b.) Small children are considered in this context to have an appetitive part and a spirited part but without a reasoned part (*Republic*, 441a–b.)

[23]*Republic*, 401d–402a.

[24]*Laws*, 653b.

[25]*Republic*, 441e.

[26]As Plato says in the *Timaeus*, "attunement [harmonía] is an ally, provided by the Muses for the soul in its fight to restore itself to order and harmony [symphonían]. Rhythm also was given for the same purpose by the same benefactors, to support us because for the most part our internal state is inconsistent and graceless." (*Timaeus*, 47d–e.) The "symphony" of the soul is to be achieved through harmony and rhythm, which comprise the authentic "art of the Muses," that is, music (with the addition of *logos*, which is to come later).

[27]See Theocharis Raptis, *Den Logos Willkommen Heissen: Die Musikerziehung Bei Platon Und Aristoteles* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2007).

[28]Moreau, "Musical Mimesis and Political Ethos in Plato's Republic," 196.

[29]Academic research on the topic has often tried to specify the exact "mechanism" of musical mimesis and its relation to the soul, that is, how does music imitate a character in the first place and how does the soul apprehend this character in the reception of music; and how does an ethical inclination grow within the soul that is exposed to a certain music. See, for example: Francesco Pelosi, *Plato on Music, Soul and Body* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511778391; Frédérique Woerther, "Music and the Education of the Soul in Plato and Aristotle: Homoeopathy and the Formation of Character," *The Classical Quarterly* 58, no. 1 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1017/S0009838808000074.

[30]See for example, *Republic*, 399a-b.

[31]*Laws*, 799e–800a, trans. Barker.

[32]See Eleonora Rocconi, "Music in Plato's Laws: First Seminar: Introduction, and Book 2, 653a–656c," in *The Main Passages Concerned with Music in Plato's Laws*, 71–89.

[33]Plato speaks of the state's laws, which have the purpose of keeping the community together, even in times of danger, such as the Persian wars in which Athens took part (*Laws*, 698a–699c.). Plato explains at length how the imminent invasion of Darius' forces mobilized the citizens of Athens who were prepared only because they were already

following the *nomoi*–and they emerged victorious: "So all these things instilled in them a friendship for one another: fear, both that which came at the time and that which sprang from the laws they already had–the fear which they possessed as a result of their enslavement to those previous laws, which we have often in the arguments before called 'awe,' and which we claimed those who are going to be good must be enslaved to." (*Laws*, 699c.) The relation of the citizens to the law is "fear" (*phóbos*) and "awe" (*aidős*), meaning "reverence" but also "shame." It is reverence for the *nomos* and shame thereof, which kept the Athenians together in times of trouble–without the laws, Plato says, they would have inevitably scattered before the Persian threat (*Laws*, 699d).

[34]*Laws*, 664a.

[35]Eleonora Rocconi, "Music in Plato's Laws.: Second Seminar: Book 2, 656d–667a," in, *The Main Passages Concerned with Music in Plato's Laws*.

[36]*Laws*, 700a.

[37]*Laws*, 700a.

[38]Eleonora Rocconi, "The Music of the Laws and the Laws of Music," *Greek and Roman Musical Studies* 4, no. 1 (2016): 73. https://doi.org/10.1163/22129758-12341268.

[39]*Laws*, 799e–800a, trans. Barker. This statement is a result of long contention. Earlier on in the dialogue Plato still maintained the difference between musical and political laws: "It is the case, I suppose, that of the songs sung to the kithara, the so-called 'laws' or *nomoi* (. . .) Yet with regard to things that are really 'laws,' the laws we assert to be political . . ." (*Laws*, 722d–e) Yet even here Plato finds similarities, although superficial, between both laws.

[40]*Laws*, 665c.

[41]Drawing on Mikhail Bakhtin, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos paints a similar picture of the relation between music and ethicality, focusing particularly on "the role of musical improvisation as a musical practice that cultivates a sense of responsibility, asking from its practitioners to live in a continuous flux between oughtness and freedom, outside and inside, reflection and immersion, interaction and autonomy, between pursuing the unknown and accepting temporary finalizations." (Panagiotis Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, "Freedom and Responsibility: The Aesthetics of Free Musical Improvisation and Its Educational Implications—A View from Bakhtin," *Philosophy of Music Education Review* 19, no. 2 (2011): 128. https://doi.org/10.2979/philmusieducrevi.19.2.113)

[42]Murray and Wilson, "Introduction: Mousikē, not Music," 2. Murray and Wilson reference the city in the *Laws* but, as some authors point out, the ideal city in the *Laws* is described only as second best (presumably in comparison to the city of the *Republic*)

[43]See Eric Csapo, "The Politics of the New Music," in Murray; Wilson, *Music and the Muses*.

[44]*Laws*, 657a–b.

[45]*Laws*, 657a–b.

[46]It is important to point out that music may be experienced alternatively as *nomic* or *anomic*, as harmonious or disharmonious. This is a necessary criterion for "judging" the educative potential and significance of musical experience. What makes musical experience (a)nomic is also a rather difficult issue that cannot be discussed in detail here.

[47]In writing this text, one of us was reminded of a funny short video on the now non-existent platform *Vine*, which featured a black adolescent enjoying country music while slowly driving his car. As some white folk came in sight and looked at him, he immediately put on a snapback cap and turned on some hip-hop music to groove on. This ironic example of our (often unconscious) prejudice with regard to the musical preferences of others is there to show that identification with a certain music is often unpredictable and independent of one's background.

[48]Heidi Westerlund, Heidi Partti, and Sidsel Karlsen, "Identity Formation and Agency in the Diverse Music Classroom," in *Handbook of Musical Identities*, ed. Raymond MacDonald, David J. Hargreaves and Dorothy Miell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).

[49]Westerlund, Partti, and Karlsen, "Identity Formation and Agency in the Diverse Music Classroom," 503.

[50]Westerlund, Partti, and Karlsen, "Identity Formation and Agency in the Diverse Music Classroom," 504.